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In a piece1 published on 22 De-cember 2020, that he describes2 as the most important thing he 
wrote in 2020, Nic Cheeseman 
penned a strong criticism of what 
he calls the ‘model of authoritar-
ian development’ in Africa. This 
phrase refers specifically to Ethi-
opia and Rwanda, the only two 
countries that fit the model, which 
is otherwise not generalisable to 
the rest of the continent. His argu-
ment, in a nutshell, is that donors 
have been increasingly enamoured 
with these two countries because 
they are seen as producing results. 
Yet the recent conflict in the Tigray 
region of Ethiopia shows that this 
argument needs to be questioned 
and discarded. He calls for support-
ing democracy in Africa, which he 
claims performs better in the long 
run than authoritarian regimes, es-
pecially in light of the conflicts and 
repression that inevitably emerge 
under authoritarianism. His argu-
ment could also be read as an im-
plicit call for regime change, stok-
ing donors to intensify political 
conditionalities on these countries 
before things get even worse. 
Cheeseman’s argument rests on a 
number of misleading empirical as-
sertions which have important im-
plications for the conclusions that 
he draws. In clarifying these, our 
point is not to defend authoritari-
anism. Instead, we hope to inject a 
measure of interpretative caution 
and to guard against opportunisti-
cally using crises to fan the disci-
plinary zeal of donors, particularly 
in a context of increasingly mili-
tarised aid regimes that have been 
associated with disastrous ventures 
into regime change. 
We make two points. First, his 
story of aid dynamics in Ethiopia 
is not supported by the data he 
cites, which instead reflect the rise 
of economic ‘reform’ programmes 
pushed by the World Bank and 
IMF. The country’s current eco-
nomic difficulties also need to be 
placed in the context of the system-
ic financial crisis currently slam-
ming the continent, in which both 
authoritarian and (nominally) dem-
ocratic regimes are faring poorly. 
Second, we reflect on Cheeseman’s 
vision of aid as a lever of regime 
change. Within already stringent 
economic adjustment programmes, 
his call for intensifying political 
conditionalities amounts to a Good 
Governance Agenda 2.0. It ignores 
the legacy of the structural adjust-
ment programmes in subverting 
deliberative governance3 on the 
continent during the 1980s and 
1990s.  
Misleading aid narratives 
distract from rebranded 
structural adjustment 
On the first point, Cheeseman es-
tablishes his argument early on by 
stating ‘that international donors 
have become increasingly willing 
to fund authoritarian regimes in 
Africa on the basis that they deliv-
er on development’. In support of 
this assertion, he cites a table from 
the World Bank that shows net 
Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) received by Ethiopia surg-
ing to USD 4.93 billion in 2018, 
up from just over USD 4 billion in 
2016 and 2017, and from a plateau 
oscillating around USD 3.5 billion 
from 2008 to 2015. 
These aggregated data are mis-
leading because ODA received by 
Ethiopia from western bilateral do-
nors in fact fell in 2018 (and prob-
ably continued falling in 2019 and 
2020). The World Bank data that he 
cites are actually from the OECD 
Development Assistance Commit-
tee (DAC) statistics, which refer to 
all official donors (but not includ-
ing countries such as China). If we 
restrict donor assistance to DAC 
countries – which is relevant given 
that Cheeseman only refers to the 
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US, the UK and the EU in his piece 
disbursed ODA to Ethiopia fell 
from USD 2.26 billion in 2017 to 
USD 2.06 billion in 2018 (see the 
red line in the figure below). 
There was a brief moderate in-
crease in DAC country ODA start-
ing in 2015 and peaking in 2017. 
Cheeseman might have been refer-
ring to this. However, contrary to 
his argument, it was likely that the 
reason for this increase in aid was 
primarily humanitarian, respond-
ing to the refugee influx from South 
Sudan4 that began in 2015 and to 
the severe drought and famine risk 
in 2016-17.5 It was also probably 
related to attempts to induce in-
cipient political reform following 
the major protests in Oromia in 
2014, aid for which Cheeseman 
would presumably condone given 
that conventional measures of de-
mocracy and freedom improved 
in 2018. Indeed, it is notable that 
committed ODA from DAC donor 
countries fell even more sharply 
than disbursed aid in 2018, from 
USD 2.49 billion in 2017 to USD 
2.07 billion, reflecting the context 
in which these countries were ne-
gotiating hard with the Ethiopian 
government at the time.
Instead, the sharp increase in 
ODA in 2018 came entirely from 
the International Development 
Association (IDA) of the World 
Bank Group, which increased its 
mixture of grants and loans to the 
country from USD 1.1 billion in 
2017 to USD 2.1 billion in 2018. 
This subsequently fell to USD 1.8 
billion in 2019 (the dashed green 
line in the figure). 
Such ODA has been explicitly tied 
to the World Bank’s long-standing 
goal of liberalising, privatising and 
deregulating the Ethiopian econo-
my, thereby ‘reforming’ (or disas-
sembling) many of the attributes that 
have allowed the Ethiopian state to 
act in a developmentalist manner. 
These attributes include state-owned 
enterprises, state control over the fi-
nancial sector, and relatively closed 
capital accounts, in strong distinc-
tion to most other countries in Africa 
(including Rwanda).
For instance, in October 2018 it 
approved USD 1.2 billion from 
the IDA6 in support of ‘a range of 
economic reforms designed to re-
vitalize the economy by expand-
ing the role of the private sector ... 
to gradually open up the 
economy and introduce 
competition to and lib-
eralize sectors that have 
been dominated by key 
state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs)’. The support 
aimed to promote public-
private partnerships in 
key state-owned sectors, 
such as telecoms, power 
and trade logistics, as 
key mechanisms to re-
structure these sectors, 
as well as broader de-
regulation and financial 
liberalisation. It is also 
notable that the World 
Bank prefaced this justi-
fication by emphasising the politi-
cal reforms that had already been 
embarked upon, and the promotion 
of ‘citizen engagement social ac-
countability’ in Ethiopia. 
In other words, contra the idea that 
western donors have been increas-
ing their support for an authoritar-
ian development model, they have 
been gradually withdrawing aid 
since 2017. The World Bank pulled 
up the slack in 2018, and in De-
cember 2019 both the World Bank7 
and IMF promised more funding8 
in support of ongoing economic re-
forms. The economic liberalisation 
has in turn undermined political 
liberalisation and has been a key 
source of political destabilisation. 
The bargaining hand of these do-
nors has been reinforced by the 
economic difficulties faced by the 
Ethiopian economy – in particu-
lar, a hard tightening of external 
foreign-exchange constraints. Bal-
ance of payments statistics9 reveal 
Figure: ODA to Ethiopia (millions USD), 2000–2019
Source: OECD stats, last accessed 30 December 2020
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that the government had effective-
ly stopped external borrowing after 
2015, a policy that it was advised 
to adopt in its Article IV consul-
tations with the IMF in 2016 and 
2017 as its external debt distress 
levels were rising. As a result, the 
government became excessively 
reliant on donor grant money as a 
principal source of foreign financ-
ing. Yet the country continued to 
run deep trade deficits, in large part 
because its development strategies, 
as elsewhere in Africa, have been 
very import and foreign-exchange 
intensive (think of the Grand Ethi-
opian Renaissance Dam, requiring 
more than USD 4.6 billion to build, 
the bulk in foreign exchange). Sig-
nificant capital flight appears to 
have taken place as well; for exam-
ple, errors and omissions reported 
on the balance of payments were 
-USD 2.14 billion in 2018. In order 
to keep the ship afloat, the central 
bank burnt through over USD 1 bil-
lion of its reserves in 2018 alone. 
This severe tightening of foreign-
exchange constraints needs to be 
understood as a critical structural 
factor in causing the development 
strategy to stall. Along with non-
economic factors, this in turn put 
considerable strain on the govern-
ment’s ability to stabilise political 
factions through the deployment of 
scarce resources, of which foreign 
exchange remains among the most 
important, especially in the current 
setting. Again, the point is not to 
apologise for authoritarianism, but 
rather to emphasise that the current 
situation is rooted deeper within a 
conjuncture of systemic crises that 
go far beyond any particular form 
of political administration. 
Indeed, Cheeseman commits a sim-
ilar oversight in ignoring the previ-
ous systemic crisis that the present 
is in many ways repeating. Later 
in his piece, he asserts: ‘The vast 
majority of African states were au-
thoritarian in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and almost all had poor economic 
growth.’ This is an ahistorical 
misrepresentation of the profound 
global crisis that crippled Africa 
from the late 1970s for about two 
decades and which was the source 
of the poor growth he mentions. 
Then, as now, economic crisis was 
triggered throughout the continent 
by the severe tightening of exter-
nal constraints, which neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes 
exacerbated in a pro-cyclical man-
ner despite being justified in the 
name of growth. The combination 
crippled developmentalist strate-
gies across the continent regardless 
of political variations and despite 
the fact that many countries were 
performing quite well before the 
onset of the crisis. Such historical 
contextualisation is crucial for a 
correct assessment of the present. 
In this respect, there is a danger of 
putting the cart before the horse. 
Most countries that descend into 
deep protracted crises (economic 
or political) generally stop be-
ing nominally democratic, and 
yet this result becomes attributed 
as a cause, as if authoritarianism 
results in crisis or poor perfor-
mance. Cheeseman cherry-picks 
two papers (one a working paper) 
on democracy10 and development11 
performance in Africa (which, like 
all cross-country regressions, are 
highly sensitive to model specifi-
cation and open to interpretation). 
However, drawing any causality 
from such studies is problematic 
given that states tended to become 
more authoritarian after the global 
economic crisis and subsequent 
structural adjustments of the late 
1970s and 1980s, not the other way 
around. For instance, 16 countries 
were under military rule in 1972, 
compared with 21 countries in 
1989 during the height of adjust-
ment.12 Faced with crippled capac-
ity under the weight of severe aus-
terity and dwindling legitimacy as 
living standards collapsed, many 
states responded to mass protests13 
against the harsh conditionalities of 
adjustment with increasing force. 
As such, economic crisis and ad-
justment plausibly contributed to 
the rise of political instability and 
increasingly authoritarian regimes. 
Other factors included the Cold 
War destabilisation,14 which west-
ern countries fuelled and profited 
from. In other words, the political 
malaise across Africa at the time 
was driven as much by external as 
by internal factors.  
Aid as a lever of regime 
change
This leads us to our second point 
concerning Cheeseman’s vision of 
aid as a lever of regime change. 
Cheeseman is at pains to emphasise 
that rigged elections and repression 
of opponents have contributed to 
the recent emergence of conflict in 
the Tigray region. While these are 
important factors, Ethiopian intel-
lectuals have also emphasised that 
conflicts in contemporary Ethiopia 
have taken place against a history 
of imperial state formation, slav-
ery and debates about the ‘national 
question’,15 or what has sometimes 
been called ‘internal colonialism’. 
These conflicts are shaped by the 
system of ethnic federalism,16 in 
which ethnically defined states 
control their own revenues, social 
provisioning and security forces. 
They have been affected by foreign 
agricultural land grabs,17 which in-
teract with older histories of semi-
feudal land dispossession. Most 
recently, there have been concerns 
that regional tensions over the Re-
naissance Dam18 and agricultural 
land19 may help draw neighbouring 
countries into the conflict. 
CODESRIA Bulletin Online, No. 1, January 2021  Page 4
In the face of this highly complex 
and rapidly changing context, no 
one person can identify the optimal 
response. It plausibly requires reg-
ular collective deliberation by peo-
ple who are deeply embedded in 
the context. In particular, the brief 
political liberalisation of 2018 was 
followed by a sharp uptick of po-
litical violence on all sides, rooted 
in fundamental tensions between 
different visions of statehood. 
Such situations cannot be solved 
simply by ‘adding democracy and 
stirring’; they require deliberative 
governance.
Yet, Cheeseman’s piece seeks a 
reimposition of the very political 
conditionalities that were a prima-
ry factor in subverting delibera-
tive governance20 on the continent 
during the first wave of structural 
adjustment and its attendant Good 
Governance agendas. Such condi-
tionalities work by constraining 
the open contestation of ideas and 
the process of informed consen-
sus-building. They undermine the 
sovereignty of key institutions of 
the polity and the economy. And 
by doing so they degrade the his-
torical meaning of development 
as a project of reclaiming social 
and economic sovereignty after 
colonialism. 
Indeed, as Thandika Mkandawire 
has argued, the previous wave of 
political conditionalities and de-
mocratisation reduced democracies 
to formal structures of elections 
and, by wedding and subordinat-
ing them to the orthodox economic 
policy frameworks established 
under structural adjustment, led 
to what he called ‘choiceless de-
mocracies’.21 Such ‘disempowered 
new democracies’ are incapable of 
responding to the substantive mac-
roeconomic demands of voters, 
which undermines substantive de-
mocracy, deliberative governance 
and policy sovereignty. 
In particular, the idea of a demo-
cratic developmental state is mean-
ingless in the absence of policy 
sovereignty. The institutional 
monocropping and monotasking22 
of the type that Mkandawire wrote 
about does not merely prevent key 
institutions, such as central banks, 
from using broader policy instru-
ments to support the developmen-
tal project. It also involves the de-
liberate creation of unaccountable 
policy vehicles, such as Monetary 
Policy Committees (MPCs), which 
operate outside of democratic over-
sight but have considerable hold 
on the levers of economic policy. 
MPCs are in turn wedded to neo-
liberal monetarism. The message 
to such disempowered new democ-
racies is that ‘You can elect any 
leader of your choice as long as s/
he does not tamper with the eco-
nomic policy that we choose for 
you.’ Or as Mkandawire wrote in 
1994,23 ‘two or three IMF experts 
sitting in a country’s reserve bank 
have more to say than the national 
association of economists about 
the direction of national policy.’
In such contexts, the prospect of 
a democratic developmental state 
is severely diminished. Ensur-
ing significant improvements in 
people’s wellbeing is important 
for the legitimacy of democracies. 
Yet the subversion of policy sov-
ereignty significantly constrains 
the ability of new democracies to 
do so, setting them up for a crisis 
of legitimacy.
If democracy is to be meaningful 
it should involve the active en-
gagement of citizens in a system 
of deliberative governance. Civil 
society organisations, in this con-
text, are meaningful when they are 
autonomous institutions of social 
groupings that actively engage in 
boisterous debate and public poli-
cymaking in articulating the inter-
est of their members. Yet, donor 
clientelism in Africa has wrought 
civil society and advocacy organ-
isations that are manufactured and 
funded by, and accountable to, 
donors24 not the citizens. This is a 
substantive subversion of democ-
racy as a system of deliberative 
governance. 
In this respect, we can call the 
kind of intrusive donor clientelism 
that Cheeseman is recommending 
Good Governance 2.0. His advoca-
cy for strengthening patron–client 
relations between western donors 
and African governments, and his 
urging that donors use crises as a 
way of forcing regime change and 
policy conditionalities, is ahistori-
cal, counterproductive and mor-
ally indefensible. In particular, it 
does not take into account the de-
structive, anti-democratic role of 
western-backed regime change and 
policy conditionality across the 
Global South during the era of flag 
independence. Even recently, these 
donor countries have disastrous 
human rights records when push-
ing for regime change in countries 
such as Afghanistan, Iraq and Lib-
ya. Their support for military dicta-
torships, such as in Egypt, has been 
a central pillar of foreign policy 
for decades. And several of these 
donor countries worked hard to 
uphold apartheid in South Africa. 
They have no moral high ground 
to push for regime change, and lit-
tle record to ensure that they could 
do so without causing more harm 
than good. 
Moreover, external actors attempt-
ing to enforce their narrow view 
of democratisation in contexts of 
deeply polarised and competing vi-
sions of statehood, and in the midst 
of economic instability reinforced 
by already burdensome economic 
conditionalities, austerity and re-
forms, could well be creating a rec-
ipe for disaster. As a collective of 
intellectuals from across the Horn 
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has emphasised,25 the people of 
Ethiopia in particular and the Horn 
in general must be at the forefront 
of developing a lasting peace. This 
would likely require a develop-
mental commitment to support-
ing state capacity and deliberative 
governance, not undermining it 
through external interference and 
conditionalities.
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